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I think you will agree that there is not much to choose between Russia and Germany, 
but I think you will also agree that the present regime in Germany must come to a 
dead end, whereas Russia does seem to point ultimately, although perhaps a very long 
way away, in the direction of sanity….1 
 
These words were written by Jack Pritchard to the Conservative MP for Hampstead, George 
Balfour, on 26 September 1938, four days before Neville Chamberlain and Édouard Daladier 
signed the Munich agreement with Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini. Pritchard was a 
Hampstead-based furniture designer, left-liberal intellectual and anti-appeaser. At the time of 
writing, Moscow had directed a wave of bloody purges and accompanying mass terror 
against its own people, and organised three well-publicised show trials, the last of them 
against Nikolai Bukharin and associates. While many on the left in Britain continued to 
support the Soviet system, even after the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of August 1939, and 
dismissed as western or ‘imperialist’ propaganda claims that Stalin was deporting, enslaving 
and murdering as many communists and non-communists as Hitler, doubts began to appear 
and were reinforced by the publication of books such as Arthur Koestler’s Darkness at Noon 
(1940).
2
 Yet in the long run, Pritchard was right. Whereas Nazi Germany went down in the 
final and totally mad ‘destruction’ and ‘self-destruction’ of 1944-45,3 the Soviet Union did 
finally begin to reverse its use of terror and redirect itself along the path of ‘sanity’.  
2 
 
The change of direction was belatedly acknowledged in the west following the leaking of 
news of Nikita Khrushchev’s ‘secret speech’ to the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist 
Party (CPSU) in February 1956, but its origins can actually be traced back to the very first 
weeks and months after Stalin’s death in March 1953.4 Indeed in many ways the eastern bloc 
and cold war ‘crises’ of the year 1953 – the cancellation of impending purges and the 
implementation of the first big amnesty for Gulag prisoners in the Soviet Union in late 
March; the announcement of a Soviet-imposed ‘New Course’ in the GDR and Hungary in 
early June; the uprisings in the Czech city of Plzeň (1-2 June) and in East Germany (17-18 
June) and their bloody suppression; the (non)-reaction to these developments in the west; and, 
finally, the continuation of West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer’s policy of 
Westintegration and rearmament under NATO’s umbrella after his success in the 
parliamentary elections in September – form the background to the events discussed in this 
volume.
5
     
 
Historical and Historiographical Overview 
The volume seeks to explore the process of rehabilitating former victims of Stalinist terror in 
five Soviet republics: Russia, Ukraine, Moldavia, Latvia and Belarus, and in six countries in 
the post-war Soviet ‘sphere of influence’: Hungary, Poland, the GDR, Czechoslovakia, 
Romania and Bulgaria. Key questions that it considers essential for understanding the legacy 
of Stalinist terror after 1953 include: when, why and on what terms were victims 
rehabilitated?; what were the main demands and expectations of the rehabilitees and their 
families, and how far were these demands satisfied?; what were the political implications of 
the rehabilitation process for incumbent communist leaderships?; why were some Soviet and 
East European Stalinists able to remain in power after 1953 and/or 1956, while others were 
permanently removed?; and to what extent were former perpetrators able to evade justice as 
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well as minimise or cover up the extent of Stalinist-era atrocities more generally? Other 
questions are important too: were communist victims treated any differently after 1953 to 
non-communist victims of Stalinist terror?; to what extent was it possible to hold 
rehabilitated political prisoners to the silence and gratitude that was expected of them?; how 
far was policy on rehabilitation determined by the ‘centre’ (Moscow), how far by national 
and local party leaderships, and how far by outside pressures, including émigré and expellee 
associations, victims’ representatives and media outlets based in the west?; and last, but not 
least, how did East European citizens, both communist and non-communist, react to the 
releases and rehabilitations, and what political impact, if any, did diverse social attitudes have 
on the post-Stalinist regimes? 
Before any of these questions can be addressed, however, it is first necessary to provide a 
brief historical and historiographical overview. Already in the first three months after Stalin’s 
death the number of prisoners in the Soviet Gulag fell from around 2.5 million to 1.3 million, 
largely as a result of the amnesty of 27 March 1953 which reduced the tariffs for those 
convicted of non-political crimes. Following several further waves of releases, amnesties and 
revision or commutation of sentences, the vast majority of MVD camps and colonies had 
been emptied by 1960 and only 550,882 inmates remained. Most of the close to three million 
persons estimated to be living in banishment in remote parts of the Soviet Union in 1953 – 
whether former political prisoners who had reached the end of their sentences, members of 
forcibly resettled national or ethnic groups, or peasants from the western regions of the USSR 
deported as kulaks – also had the remaining restrictions on their freedom of movement lifted 
between 1954 and the early 1960s.
6
 Millions of children orphaned by the terror and 
subsequently brought up in state-run institutions, and relatives of Gulag prisoners who had 
faced harsh forms of discrimination in the spheres of education, welfare, right to travel and 
employment, likewise benefitted from the post-Stalinist ‘Thaw’.7  
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    Meanwhile, as a result of petitions from individual citizens or recommendations made by 
various sentencing review commissions, courts were instructed to re-examine large numbers 
of political cases, and between 1954 and 1961 up to 800,000 Soviet citizens, some dead, 
some living, and tens of thousands of foreigners, were formally rehabilitated in the sense of 
having their convictions overturned.
8
 Khrushchev, while himself heavily implicated in some 
of the crimes committed under Stalin, nonetheless became a firm advocate not only of the 
restoration of ‘socialist legality’ (meaning, among other things, ending the use of torture in 
police interrogations) but also of the release and rehabilitation process, telling delegates at the 
1956 party conference that the ‘unprecedented violation of revolutionary legality’ during the 
years 1936 to 1953 could not simply be forgotten or swept under the carpet.
9
 In 1961 he 
ordered the removal of Stalin’s body from the Mausoleum on Moscow’s Red Square, and in 
1962 he personally intervened to make possible the publication of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn’s 
novella about the Gulag, One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich.
10
 One leading German 
expert on the Stalin era, Jörg Baberowski, has even described the far-reaching changes 
brought about by Khrushchev as a ‘cultural revolution and civilising achievement which 
changed the lives of millions’.11  
Given that the measures outlined above also had major implications for the communist 
countries of Eastern Europe, and for western republics of the Soviet Union which had 
witnessed large scale deportations to the east during the Stalin era, it is astonishing how little 
attention has been paid to the rehabilitation issue in previous literature.
12
 On the one hand, 
these countries and republics now had to reintegrate some of the prisoners released from the 
Gulag – those, not few in number, who had a claim to be repatriated or resettled in their 
original homelands after years of living in captivity or forced exile. As Matthew Stibbe 
demonstrates in his chapter, this posed a particular challenge to the GDR and its claim to 
represent the ‘better Germany’ in the 1950s. On the other hand, the East European states had 
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also instigated their own terror systems during the years 1948-53. In some of the Soviet bloc 
countries this involved the staging of high-profile show trials against alleged ‘Titoists’ or 
‘Zionists’, and in all of them, the imprisonment of large numbers of real and presumed 
ideological opponents and ‘class enemies’. The Czechoslovaks, Romanians and East 
Germans even continued to hold frame-up political trials, albeit in camera rather than as 
public events, in 1954 and 1955.
13
 Thereafter pressure grew to follow the Kremlin’s lead and 
end the practice of extra-judicial purges, mass incarceration and overt political repression. 
Equally, Soviet bloc countries were urged to establish sentencing review bodies and 
rehabilitation commissions of their own, with some satellite nations – notably Hungary and, 
to a lesser extent, Poland – proving more willing than others, and one country in particular, 
Czechoslovakia, experiencing a delayed, but far-reaching, form of de-Stalinisation in the 
1960s which failed with the crushing of the Prague Spring in 1968. Ironically but tellingly, 
the only Warsaw Pact state that refused to participate in the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia 
– Romania – was also the one that had gone least far in terms of restoring justice to domestic 
victims of terror. Instead, as Calin Goina shows in his chapter, although three separate 
amnesties took place in the early 1960s, the country’s formal break with Stalinism was more 
or less restricted to the years 1968-69, when selected individuals were publicly rehabilitated 
to serve the new nationalist direction taken by the maverick dictator Nicolae Ceauşescu.   
In the 1970s the number of political prisoners rose again across the Soviet bloc, in spite of 
the signing of the Helsinki agreements in 1975. Although they were no longer allowed to use 
physical force or torture, the communist security services could still harass people, spy on 
them, blackmail them, collect evidence for use against them in criminal state prosecutions, 
and even have them confined to psychiatric institutions.
14
 In reality a full reckoning with 
Stalin’s legacy was not possible until communist rule came to an end in the late 1980s and 
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early 1990s. Yet even now the process of rehabilitation is still ongoing, both in Eastern 
Europe and in the successor states of the Soviet Union. 
 
Rehabilitation, Restitution and Transitional Justice in Global Context  
The collapse of a variety of left- and right-wing dictatorships across the world at the end of 
the twentieth and beginning of the twenty-first centuries has cast Soviet history from 1953 to 
1991 in a new light. It has also raised more general questions about how states and societies 
cope with the transition from a violent past to what is hoped will be a more just and peaceful 
future, while underlining the fact that the dilemmas faced by communist and post-communist 
regimes in dealing with Stalinist era crimes were far from unique.
15
 One could mention, 
among other examples, the human rights abuses practiced by various military juntas in Latin 
America as well as in Spain, Portugal and Greece in the period up to 1974-75, or the 
atrocities committed by South Africa’s apartheid governments between 1948 and 1990. 
However, the most obvious point of comparison in our case would be with West Germany 
after 1949. Here historians have shown how an initial emphasis on Germans as victims, 
shown for instance by frequent calls in the early 1950s for amnesties for convicted Nazi war 
criminals and for the lifting of employment bans and other restrictions imposed under Allied 
de-Nazification measures, gradually gave way to a growing recognition of the importance of 
facing up to the past, particularly after the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem in 1961. In Ulm in 
1958 and more conspicuously in Frankfurt-am-Main in 1963-65, federal cases were launched 
in West German criminal courts against former members of the security police and SS mobile 
killing squads (Einsatzgruppen), officials at the Auschwitz death camp, and other 
perpetrators of Nazi atrocities, with Holocaust survivors appearing for the first time as 
prosecution witnesses for the German state; and in June 1969 the 20-year statute of limitation 
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was completely lifted for acts of murder and genocide committed during the Second World 
War.
16
    
By this time the primary victims of the Third Reich were increasingly (although by no 
means universally) recognised in wider ‘discourses of restitution’ as being non-Germans, 
especially by the younger generation of Germans born after 1939. Internationally as well as 
domestically, this was symbolised by the spontaneous decision of Social Democrat 
Chancellor Willy Brandt to kneel before the monument to the fallen of the 1943 Warsaw 
Ghetto Uprising during an official visit to the Polish capital in December 1970.
17
 However, 
when it came to achieving redress for individuals, West German law allowed financial 
compensation and restitution to be granted to former or current German nationals only. What 
is more, the latter also had to demonstrate that they had been unjustly or unlawfully 
persecuted by the Nazi regime – and not just treated harshly by it. Under the London Debt 
Agreement of 1953, claims for crimes committed against non-Germans were rendered the 
exclusive preserve of state governments and treated under the heading ‘war reparations’, 
placing them outside the jurisdiction of West German courts and postponing any settlement 
until a final peace treaty ending the Second World War could be signed. Among other things, 
this meant that it was only after German reunification in 1990 that compensation (and 
therefore full moral and public redress for the wrong done to them) could be granted to 
former forced foreign workers in the Nazi war economy and to non-German victims of anti-
Jewish property confiscations. In 2000 the German government and leading businesses 
finally agreed to set up a special fund for this purpose, but before this could happen further 
legal arguments were necessary, including a ruling from the federal constitutional court in 
1996 which for the first time permitted individual claims for reparations from foreign 
nationals.
18
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What social scientists and jurists refer to as ‘transitional justice’ has therefore played a 
profound role not only in the process of political transformation in Germany since 1949, but 
also in the reshaping of attitudes towards all victims of National Socialism, irrespective of 
their nationality or origin, and towards the law itself as an instrument of restitution. 
Moreover, since 1990 this long-term shift in perspective has become part of a globalised, and 
not just German, response to the legacy of the Holocaust – especially as the ‘German 
question’ itself no longer plays a significant role in world affairs, at least in the form that it 
took during the Cold War from 1945 to 1989.
19
 The ‘Memorial to the Murdered Jews of 
Europe’, opened in Berlin in 2005 on a specially chosen site near to the Reichstag building 
and the Brandenburg Gate, now serves in effect as an international monument to humanity’s 
worst crime. Yet closer to home, as a recent report in the German magazine Der Spiegel 
suggests, there are still some issues from the Nazi past that have yet to be satisfactorily 
resolved, including the question as to whether Germans compulsorily sterilised between 1934 
and 1945 on grounds of having a hereditary health condition or ‘inherited feeble-mindedness’ 
can finally achieve legal recognition as victims of National Socialist crimes.
20
 Equally, 
members of the Green Party in Germany have been seeking to rehabilitate victims of the anti-
homosexual laws (paragraphs 175 and 175a of the penal code) who were prosecuted in West 
Germany after 1945, following the belated recognition in 2002 of the legal and personal 
wrong done to those imprisoned under the same laws in Nazi Germany.
21
 In other words, 
‘transitional justice’ can delay or prevent, as well as facilitate, change; and furthermore it can 
help to determine, for better or for worse, who is and who is not to be counted as a victim in 
need of restitution and redress.  
These examples are relevant to us because in Putin’s Russia there are frequent, and often 
uncomfortable, reminders that the Stalinist past has not yet been completely overcome, both 
in the political and judicial senses – even though Stalinism, like Nazism, is now part of a 
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globalised debate about the violent legacy of the twentieth century and the best way of 
providing justice for victims of state terror.
22
 For instance, the Soviet-era monument to the 
victims of the Gulag on Lubianka square in central Moscow, which was built in front of what 
was then still the central KGB headquarters by members of the human rights group Memorial 
in 1990, has yet to receive an official visit from Putin.
23
 The latter, of course, was himself 
once a Lieutenant Colonel in the KGB. Furthermore, as Marc Elie indicates at the end of his 
contribution to this volume, there are still areas of the current Russian penal code concerning 
offences like ‘hooliganism’ (used to imprison members of the feminist punk band Pussy Riot, 
among others) that hark back to the judicial assumptions and sentencing practices of the 
1930s.
24
 On top of this, anti-Ukrainian Greater Russian nationalism and propaganda depicting 
ethnic Russians as ‘victims’ has bred a more positive reassessment of the Nazi-Soviet pact of 
1939 and a silence about the subsequent horrors inflicted by Stalin on eastern Poland, 
Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina and the Baltic states, including mass executions and 
deportations.
25
 Official recognition, rehabilitation and restitution are thus far from a given for 
Stalinist terror victims even today. However, perhaps more importantly for our purposes, the 
appearance of new categories of victim and victimhood in official discourses also 
demonstrates that, over and above any particular national specificities, rehabilitation – and 
with it restitution or the righting of historical wrongs – can be a volatile, highly contested and 
seemingly never-ending process which takes on different meanings in different historical and 
social contexts.  
The experience of Eastern Europe since 1953 fits in with this general observation. 
Admittedly here there were no foreign victims of the ‘mini-Stalinist’ regimes of the late 
1940s and early 1950s to atone for, just domestic victims, while today – with the exception of 
Belarus – membership or aspiring membership of the EU militates against authoritarian or 
closed legal and political practices. Yet, as several of the essays in this volume indicate, this 
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region too is no stranger to the highly contested and seemingly never-ending nature of the 
rehabilitation process. Furthermore, the shifting and at times contradictory needs of surviving 
terror victims and of the families of the deceased, whether for acknowledgement of their 
suffering and the restoration of their good names, or for privacy and silence, has often come 
into conflict with the competing claims of (transitioning) nation-states, the legal profession, 
political parties, the ‘reformed’ security services, the media and other (self-appointed) 
guardians of official ‘memory’ or ‘societal interest’.26 In this respect, the history of 
rehabilitation in Eastern Europe overlaps considerably with that of rehabilitation in the Soviet 
Union since 1953 and the Russian Federation since 1992.  
 
Timelines and Chronology 
Turning now from the global and comparative to the regional and historically specific, one 
key overarching issue that needs to be addressed from the outset is that of chronology or how 
to account for the differing pace and extent of rehabilitations in different Soviet republics and 
East European countries, each with their own particular socio-economic conditions, political 
cultures and experiences of Stalinist repression. Indeed, a central theme of this volume is the 
importance of seeing post-Stalinist rehabilitation along a multi-dimensional continuum 
characterised by varying time-spans, modes of delivery, levels of intensity and degrees of 
openness, depending on particular local, national, regional and international factors. Even if 
we were to focus on the Soviet Union alone, what Tony Judt calls the ‘controlled de-
Stalinization’27 of the Khrushchev era cannot be restricted to the year 1956, but rather 
constituted a series of measures which began in fits and starts in 1953 and was not completed 
until the early 1960s. At home, but also in countries like Hungary, Poland and the GDR, the 
intention was to strengthen the socialist system through economic reforms and the lifting of 
terror and outright repression. The uprisings of 1953 and 1956 certainly slowed this process 
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down, but it did not bring it to a permanent halt. De-Stalinisation was also linked to some of 
Khrushchev’s wider foreign policy objectives, including ‘peaceful coexistence’ with the west, 
reconciliation with Tito’s Yugoslavia and the establishment of closer relations with other 
‘non-aligned’ nations such as Egypt and India.28  
Precisely because it served the new Soviet leader’s political ambitions, the post-1953 
‘Thaw’ is often said to have ended the terror without having achieved a full restoration of the 
rule of law or a complete reappraisal of the relationship between the party, state and criminal 
justice system.
29
 Indeed, Elie, in his contribution to this volume, suggests that only one third 
of former political prisoners had been able to get their cases re-examined by Soviet courts by 
1960; the remainder had merely benefited from early release or pardons without 
rehabilitation, formal acquittal or exoneration. For disappointed West European communists 
and Hungarian reformers in particular, Khrushchev also had fresh blood on his hands in the 
sense that he approved the execution of the Hungarian leader Imre Nagy in June 1958 even 
though, over 18 months after the crushing of the Hungarian uprising, he no longer posed any 
kind of ideological or political threat.
30
 The repercussions of ‘Budapest 1956’ and its 
aftermath were felt outside the Soviet Union too. In Bulgaria, for instance, as Jordan Baev 
shows in his chapter, labour camps were reopened at the end of 1956 and the rehabilitation 
process was put on ice apart from a brief window between 1959 and 1962. 
Yet taking a different perspective and moving along a different time line, we can see that 
Khrushchev’s reforms in 1953-56 and his renewed efforts to distance himself morally from 
Stalinism at the 22
nd
 congress of the CPSU in October 1961 were merely the beginning and 
certainly not the end of a longer-term process.
31
 For instance, although the political 
momentum behind rehabilitations stalled again in 1962-63 in the USSR, Bulgaria and pretty 
much everywhere else in Eastern Europe (with the partial exception of Czechoslovakia), and 
although public criticism of Stalin was in effect banned after 1964 under the catch-all offence 
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of ‘slandering the Soviet social and state system’,32 one source suggests that between 1962 
and 1983 as many as 157,000 people still had political convictions from the years 1936 to 
1953 quietly overturned by Soviet courts.
33
 Even in Soviet Moldavia, where, as Igor Caşu 
suggests, rehabilitations of elite victims of the purges had virtually come to an end in 1958, 
923 individuals successfully applied to have their convictions overturned between 1962 and 
1988, representing an average of 35 a year. Nonetheless, in the Brezhnev era perpetrators of 
Stalinist-era crimes could also find themselves being rehabilitated, particularly if their 
offences were mitigated by service to the Fatherland during the Great Patriotic War. After 
1962, and especially after Khrushchev’s fall from power in 1964, Soviet policy certainly 
became more hard line in its approach to former terror victims, but to talk of a policy of ‘re-
Stalinisation’, as some historians do, would be an overstatement.34   
Much greater progress towards righting the wrongs of the past was made in the late 1980s, 
during the Gorbachev era, including in 1988 the nullification by the Soviet Supreme Court of 
the convictions and death sentences carried out against top Bolsheviks and military leaders at 
the time of the three great show trials of 1936-38.
35
 In total around one million Soviet citizens 
were rehabilitated between 1989 and the end of 1991, when claims were looked at for the 
whole Stalinist period from 1929 to 1953, and not, as previously, just the years after 1936.
36
 
However, even this did not draw a final line under the past or solve the problem of restitution 
at national or international level. Instead, post-communist regimes in all the countries 
affected have passed – and continue to pass – new pieces of legislation regarding 
rehabilitation of former victims of Stalinist terror.
37
 
 
Typologies of Victimhood and Rehabilitation 
Those seeking rehabilitation after 1953 had been exposed to a number of different forms of 
state repression. Some had been arrested, tried, imprisoned, deported and/or shot at the behest 
13 
 
of extra-judicial bodies (the so-called troikas), while others had been assigned by 
administrative means to various terms of exile or forced labour, and others still had been 
sentenced in judicial fashion by courts or military tribunals, albeit usually combined with use 
of fabricated evidence, false confessions, unreliable witnesses and so on. Most victims had 
been accused of some kind of anti-Soviet or anti-state activity, or of conspiring with the 
‘enemies of socialism’ to overthrow the communist system and restore capitalism. However, 
some had been persecuted for who they were (kulaks, members of ‘bourgeois’ national 
groups and other ‘class enemies’) rather than for what they had supposedly done. 
Disentangling ‘economic’ from ‘political’ offences was also a very tricky task, especially 
when it came to issues like currency speculation, industrial sabotage or opposition to the 
collectivisation of farms, which were often punished more harshly to meet the demands of 
‘class justice’.  
 More controversially for the rehabilitation process, some released prisoners had been 
sentenced as war criminals, accused of collaboration with the Germans during the Second 
World War or, worse still, of direct involvement in murderous actions against Jews and 
partisans. This makes it less easy to classify them as victims of Stalinist terror. Nonetheless, 
as our contributions on the western republics of the USSR and on Poland, the GDR, 
Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria demonstrate, those convicted of wartime offences could also 
benefit from amnesties or have their sentences reduced as part of the more general re-
examination of judicial practices that followed Stalin’s death. Countries that had been 
occupied by the Germans during the war usually had the most difficulty in confronting this 
issue. According to Iryna Ramanava, in her chapter on Belarus, the treatment of former 
collaborators and the definition of different degrees of culpability for involvement in Nazi 
war crimes was also one of the most hotly contested aspects of a new round of judicial 
revisions in the late 1980s and 1990s, and is still an unresolved question in Minsk even today 
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– so much so that negative memories of wartime ‘fascist’ traitors are now part of a more 
positive reassessment of ‘Soviet values’ and a corresponding tendency to downplay Stalinist-
era purges and mass repression. 
 While defining victims is hard enough, the term ‘rehabilitation’ itself creates even greater 
difficulties. In the communist era it was rarely used by Soviet or Eastern European authorities 
as it implied an admission that the state was guilty of perpetrating past injustices, including 
repression of elites and whole social groups. In private individuals may have been 
rehabilitated, but in public the talk was usually of ‘amnesties’ and ‘pardons’, thus drawing 
attention to the supposed beneficence of the communist system. Yet it is intriguing that even 
in western and post-communist eastern historiography on this theme it is comparatively rare 
to come across specific definitions of the varying forms of rehabilitation.
38
 To redress the 
balance we have identified four types of rehabilitation: judicial; political; socio-economic; 
and moral. We also include the related notion of amnesties or pardons.  
 
Judicial Rehabilitation     
Judicial rehabilitation signified that the ‘crime’ and sentence were legally annulled by the 
courts, the now ‘innocent’ ex-prisoner was effectively exonerated, and implicitly at least, it 
was recognised by the communist authorities that gross miscarriages of justice had taken 
place. This, in turn, opened up the possibility of financial restitution and other forms of 
compensation for the suffering endured, itself a potential economic burden for the state. This 
process went furthest in Czechoslovakia in 1968, when a law was enacted, temporarily as it 
turned out, granting full judicial and social rehabilitation to those wrongfully convicted, 
including large numbers of non-communists. However, no other communist state, including 
the USSR at the time of Khrushchev’s ‘Thaw’, went so far in this direction. Instead, cases 
were reviewed on an individual basis. While this inevitably made judicial rehabilitation a 
15 
 
very slow process, it also enabled victims to take part in and shape the rehabilitation debate, 
as they were obliged to petition the authorities for a review of their own cases (see, for 
example, Elie’s chapter on Soviet policy). In Poland too the rehabilitation process was partly 
driven by determined individuals who demanded to have their cases (or those of deceased 
family members) reopened, as Piotr Kładoczny shows in his contribution. For those who 
were unwilling to accept a mere amnesty, he contends, the legal route remained the only path 
to full exoneration, and an inherently perilous one in the sense that it offered no certainty of 
success or closure. The same was the case in Belarus, where – according to some of the 
examples cited by Ramanava in her chapter – judicial reviews could end up confirming the 
guilt of the accused, even if the original charges were ‘re-determined’ and the sentence 
correspondingly reduced. 
 
Political Rehabilitation 
Political rehabilitation took place when the party authorities accepted that the ideological 
charges against the victim were false and reinstated former prisoners into the ranks of party, 
occasionally even allowing a return to responsible positions in the apparatus. This was highly 
problematic to say the least for incumbent party leaders, because on a personal level so many 
of them were tainted by the repressions of the Stalinist period and had no wish for their past 
actions to be critically examined. As Andrea Pető demonstrates, in Hungary the communist 
leadership involved itself in numerous contortions between 1954 and 1956 when faced with 
repeated demands made by Júlia Rajk, widow of the executed Minister of Interior Lászlo 
Rajk, for her own and her husband’s political rehabilitation. Ideologically, political 
rehabilitation was also extremely dangerous in that it could easily cast the entire communist 
project into doubt and raise very awkward questions: how was it possible that party 
functionaries condoned such gross illegalities and violations of justice, permitted the mental 
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and physical torture of suspects, encouraged contempt for the rule of law and independent 
judiciaries, and trampled on human dignity in the name of a higher goal? In these 
circumstances, it is no wonder that communist leaders routinely dragged their heels on 
rehabilitation. Nonetheless, a surprising number of former victims sought – or were urged to 
reapply for – party membership, either from ideological conviction and a belief that 
Khrushchev had restored ‘Leninist norms’, or because this was the best way of securing 
economic or career advancement. Others followed the example of Júlia Rajk in seeking 
posthumous restoration of membership for deceased relatives. As one pro-communist Soviet 
woman wrote in an application for the reinstatement of her dead mother’s party card: 
‘Judicial rehabilitation…. without Party rehabilitation is still not rehabilitation’.39 
 At other times, communist regimes even forced through the rehabilitation of selected 
individuals as part of a reworking of the ‘political imaginary’. As Goina shows, the 
Romanian dictator Ceauşescu literally ordered the posthumous rehabilitation of one terror 
victim, Lucrețiu Pătrășcanu, in 1968 because this fitted with his desire to rewrite Romanian 
history textbooks in order to emphasise Romania’s distance from Moscow and break the 
previous all-consuming stress on the primary of Russia’s influence on Romania’s 
development as a political and cultural nation. A broadly similar, although less top-down and 
certainly less anti-Russian, process was observable in Slovakia where the National Uprising 
against the collaborationist Tiso regime in 1944 was ‘returned to official memory’ after 1962 
alongside the rehabilitation of several Slovak communists accused of class betrayal and 
‘bourgeois nationalism’ in the 1950s. Among them was the future party General Secretary 
Gustáv Husák who had his party card returned in 1963. More generally, the Slovak national 
movement and the flowering of Slovak culture in the nineteenth century was restored to the 
pantheon of ‘progressive moments’ from the past and integrated into existing Marxist-
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Leninist understandings of Czechoslovak history, with the apparent approval or at least 
acquiescence of the pre-1968 party elite in Prague and Bratislava.
40
 
 The communist leadership in the GDR had no intention of changing the ‘political 
imaginary’ in East Germany, however. Instead, as Stibbe shows, in the mid-1950s it resorted 
to a quiet and carefully controlled form of political rehabilitation as a necessary step to 
defend its self-image after the Soviet Union released and repatriated several dozen purged 
German party veterans whose stories of betrayal and hardship in the 1930s now threatened to 
undermine the claim that the East was successfully leading the people towards the 
construction of a progressive and more humane alternative to West German capitalism. Small 
wonder, then, that when rehabilitated communist veterans were asked to write their memoirs 
for the party, they were encouraged to focus on the First World War and Weimar periods, 
now billed as times of great revolutionary promise and youthful idealism, while being 
directed to remain silent about the trials and tribulations they had faced in Soviet exile after 
1935.
41
 
 
Socio-economic Rehabilitation  
Socio-economic rehabilitation meant a number of different things. In the best case scenario, 
where prisoners were rehabilitated and formally recognised as innocent, they had a 
theoretical right to restitution in the sense of a restoration of confiscated property and 
compensation for the loss of freedom and forced labour required of them in prison or in the 
Gulag. Yet even if this kind of restitution was not on offer (and it rarely was, at least before 
1989), a full reintegration of released prisoners into society at least implied a right to 
employment commensurate with their skills and education, a right to decent housing, social 
welfare and pensions, and an expectation that their children would not be discriminated 
against in terms of education and jobs. As we know, reality was often very different, although 
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Stephen Cohen argues that, once the official formalities were completed, the majority of 
rehabilitees ‘eventually received…. living space, a job or a pension, health and dental 
care….and other modest benefits of the expanding Soviet welfare system’.42 This probably 
only applied to urban dwellers, however, and even here, as Oleg Bazhan points out in his 
chapter on Soviet Ukraine, the Council of Ministers had to intervene to oblige employers, 
factory managers and directors of construction sites to hire former prisoners. The fear, which 
was not without foundation, was that those who remained out of work for a long time would 
turn to crime or other forms of anti-social behaviour.  
 Farmers often fared much worse, especially if they came back to areas which had 
experienced fully-fledged collectivisation in the late 1940s and early 1950s. As Ramanava, 
Irēna Saleniece and Kevin McDermott and Klára Pinerová reveal in their respective chapters 
on Belarus, Latvia and Czechoslovakia, returnees could indeed be treated with a great deal of 
suspicion by former neighbours, particularly by those who had taken over their property 
during their absence. Oral testimony from Latvia suggests that some returnees even 
contemplated going back to Siberia, where ironically they were treated with more respect and 
could live a better life. Likewise, in Soviet Moldavia only a few farmers got their property 
back, and this was only those who could prove that their classification as kulaks was 
unjustified. Indeed, paradoxically restoration of property took place only by upholding, rather 
than challenging, Stalinist-era definitions of who was and who was not a kulak. Meanwhile, 
Lithuanian deportees, among the last to leave the Gulag, already approached their impending 
freedom with a mixture of ‘excitement and worry’ since – according to the memoirs of a 
Latvian woman interned with them – they knew both that ‘leaving confinement was not a 
happy prospect if one did not have relatives or close friends waiting outside’ and – worse still 
– that ‘being expected and well-received was not as important as having a place to stay’.43   
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 The broader issue here, then, is the thorny one of how returnees were to be treated after 
their release – as fully fledged members of society or as second, perhaps third, class citizens? 
If the latter, then what were the implications for further ‘dissent’ and ‘oppositional’ activity, 
particularly from those who clamoured for a more expansive form of justice, including full 
public revelation of the injustice done to them, compensation for years lost in the Gulag, and 
prosecution of alleged perpetrators? And what about those who were still seen as traitors in 
the Second World War – for instance, those who had served in special auxiliary detachments 
of the German army or security police? Certainly in Soviet Ukraine, as Bazhan shows, there 
are documented cases of rehabilitated ‘collaborators’ suffering violence and refusal of 
employment from local people after 1955. 
 
Moral Rehabilitation 
Moral rehabilitation restores the ‘good name’ of the victim and formally recognised their 
innocence, thereby creating a sense that historical ‘truth’ had been upheld and the wrongs of 
the past had been righted. It is thus linked to broader expectations about the recovery of the 
rule of law and an ‘honest’ or ‘open’ reappraisal of previous judicial as well as political 
assumptions and practices at the collective level. Or, to paraphrase Ruti Teitel, in times of 
political transition what is held to be ‘just’ moral rehabilitation ‘transcend[s] redress to the 
affected individuals and their survivors’. Instead it ‘is contingent and informed by prior 
injustice’, including, in this instance, the development of public knowledge of the 
unwarranted use by the party or state of falsified evidence, malicious denunciations, torture, 
abuse of administrative process, and extra-judicial forms of sentencing.
44
  
 Moral rehabilitation also raises the potentially explosive question of the guilt of 
perpetrators, particularly secret police investigators, and whether they should face retribution 
and punishment. Such treatment, however, was rare. It is true that in the Soviet Union several 
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high-ranking NKVD/MVD bosses were executed after Stalin’s death, including Lavrentii 
Beria, Viktor Abakumov and others,
45
 and in Czechoslovakia two security officers were 
briefly imprisoned for their illegal methods of interrogation. Nonetheless, in the 1950s the 
moral basis of rehabilitation was undermined by the fact that many of the perpetrators were 
placed in charge of investigating themselves, most notoriously in the case of Ivan Serov, who 
– with Khrushchev’s blessing – became head of the newly re-named KGB in March 1954 and 
made several attempts to limit the scope of investigations into the past misdeeds of the Soviet 
security organs (see the contributions by Elie, Caşu, Bazhan and Ramanava). Other 
difficulties included lack of surviving records and evidence linked to names, particularly, as 
Saleniece points out in her chapter on Latvia, in respect to local ‘volunteers’ who took part 
unofficially in deportations and were often known to have plundered the victims’ 
possessions. Without a proper, independent and transparent process for bringing the 
perpetrators and their helpers to justice, there was arguably no rehabilitation in the moral 
sense. 
 
Amnesties and Pardons     
Amnesties and pardons were the most common forms of redress, but they did not represent 
‘rehabilitation’. Those amnestied were not declared legally innocent, and hence were still 
regarded as ‘criminals’ and lived in constant fear of re-arrest. In Soviet Moldavia and 
Ukraine, as Caşu and Bazhan suggest, many of those who returned from the Gulag and 
special settlements did not have formal permission to do so and their presence in their 
homeland was merely tolerated by the authorities in Moscow, Chișinău and Kiev. Only 
children under 16 and youths in full-time education were entirely free from surveillance and 
other forms of official discrimination related to their past status as prisoners or deportees. In 
Ukraine, according to Bazhan, public proposals were heard calling on the authorities to put 
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amnestied prisoners to work on probationary contracts on building sites. In Poland, on the 
other hand, as Kładoczny indicates, the far-reaching amnesty of April 1956 was deliberately 
used as a (partially successful) means of discouraging individual bids for rehabilitation, the 
regime calculating that most of the beneficiaries would simply be glad to be released from 
prison and would not risk their newly-gained freedom by making trouble for the authorities.  
 In general, amnesties confirmed the power and authority of the state and were therefore 
much preferred to rehabilitation.
46
 Sometimes they were granted to mark special occasions, 
like the extensive 9 May 1960 amnesty in Czechoslovakia, which was enacted to 
commemorate the 50th anniversary of the country’s liberation by the Red Army in May 1945. 
At other moments they were billed as an act of generosity and mark of self-confidence in 
view of recent advances in the construction of socialism. The East German amnesty of 4 
October 1960, announced to mark the death of state president Wilhelm Pieck and the 
elevation of Walter Ulbricht to chairman of the newly-formed State Council, was presented in 
this manner, although in reality it was a quick-fix measure aimed mainly at reducing the 
number of ‘ordinary criminals’ in prisons in anticipation of an increase in political repression 
(and a corresponding rise in judicial proceedings against ‘state criminals’) in the wake of a 
new campaign of forced collectivisation unleashed on the countryside.
47
 In sum, amnesties 
were different to rehabilitations, and could sometimes herald an intensification of, as opposed 
to a reduction in, state abuses against (real or perceived) political opponents. This was not 
always the case, however, and depended on the particular context. 
 
Ambivalence and Secrecy 
While the categories listed above are illuminating, especially when it comes to identifying 
individual, local, regional and national variations in experience and emphasis, this should not 
detract from the fundamental ambivalence of the situation facing former victims of Stalinist 
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terror in the post-1953 Soviet bloc. Indeed, as Ramanava demonstrates in her chapter on 
Belarus, one of the key features of rehabilitation, as opposed to the various amnesties and 
pardons, is that the whole process was undertaken as far as possible in secrecy. There was no 
public fanfare or coverage in the press, the release of prisoners, both communist and non-
communist, went unannounced and a kind of unstable hiatus was created in society – or what 
Polly Jones has termed ‘the uncertain discourse of rehabilitation’.48 With no consistent policy 
directives coming from above, with tentative reform mingling with periodic crackdowns, 
both ex-prisoners and their families, and society more generally, were unsure about the 
meaning of the party ‘line’, unsure about the bounds of the possible and the impossible. 
Towards the end of her study of the Gulag, Anne Applebaum notes that even after 1960 
‘many former prisoners [in the Soviet Union]….remained wary of applying’ for a revision of 
their cases: 
Those who received a summons to appear at a meeting of a rehabilitation commission, 
usually held within the offices of the MVD or the Justice Ministry, would often turn 
up in layers of clothes, gripping food parcels, accompanied by weeping relatives, 
certain they were about to be sent away again.
49
     
The implications of this essential ambivalence at the heart of the rehabilitation process, and 
more broadly the tortuous ‘de-Stalinisation’ campaigns of the mid-to-late 1950s and early 
1960s, is an important theme in all of the contributions to this volume. Indeed, in spite of the 
momentous political changes in the Soviet Union between 1953 and 1964, reintegrating 
prisoners and dealing with the past was an extremely difficult process which involved as 
much deliberate forgetting on all sides as it did carefully controlled acts of remembering, 
truth-seeking and absolution. As we have seen, only a handful of perpetrators were ever 
brought to justice, while the Khrushchev regime continued to mobilise the myth of the Great 
Patriotic War of 1941-45 as a time when all Soviet citizens, and indeed all anti-fascists, were 
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‘victims and heroes together’.50 Although terror ceased, and what is more quite abruptly in 
1953, and although the Gulag itself ‘seemed a thing of the past’ by 1960,51 the Soviet Union 
remained a one-party dictatorship with political dissidents still running the risk of prosecution 
for ‘anti-Soviet agitation’. In 1958, for instance, 1,416 people were found guilty of this 
offence.
52
 Moreover, from 1962 sentences for ‘dangerous state crimes’ such as ‘treason 
against the homeland’ or ‘anti-Soviet agitation’ (which by now could include passing on 
information about Stalinist-era repression and deportations to foreign visitors) often meant 
transportation to harsh KGB-run corrective labour camps in Siberia and the Russian Far East, 
whereas most non-political offences now ‘qualif[ied] as social crimes’, with jail terms usually 
being served nearer to home.
53
 Against this background, older fears, suspicions and 
resentments lingered on in the minds both of former victims still seeking redress from the 
party-state and ordinary Soviet citizens confused by the mixed messages they often received 
about the Stalin era.
54
 As Miriam Dobson deftly puts it, ‘where ordinary criminal justice 
practices stopped and political terror began’ was a question hardly resolved in the 
Khrushchev era. Instead it remained ‘an ongoing source of contestation’ from 1953 right the 
way through to the Gorbachev era.
55
  
 
The Party, Popular Opinion and Rehabilitation 
A final salient issue is the attitude of party members and the public to the release and 
rehabilitation of Stalinist victims: how far were party and popular responses to the liberation 
of former ‘enemies’ hostile, supportive, confused, contradictory, ambivalent? Judging from 
existing literature, there was a highly diverse reaction to the amnesties and rehabilitations and 
this in itself is noteworthy – notions of a completely ‘Stalinised’ party membership and an 
‘indoctrinated’ passive populace need to be challenged. Among rank-and-file party activists 
and even hardened lower-level functionaries, the dominant initial reaction to the 20th 
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Congress sensations and the early de-Stalinisation measures was one of profound shock and 
disorientation bordering on chaos. Such responses were certainly common in the Soviet and 
Czechoslovak parties,
56
 and it is difficult to under-estimate the acute dilemmas these 
reactions posed to incumbent leaders: how to rein in the threat to disorder and internal party 
discipline while rejecting undue ‘Stalinist’ repression? The balancing act between persuasion 
and coercion proved a delicate task for Khrushchev and his acolytes in Eastern Europe and 
their indeterminacy helps to explain the ‘zig-zag’ nature of communist rule in the ‘Thaw’ 
period. At the same time, however, there is evidence that communist parties, with the partial 
exception of the Polish and Hungarian, possessed a resilient ‘indigenous Stalinism’, which 
helped to bind the parties together in the crisis year of 1956, and beyond. 
 Opinion among non-communist citizens was also multifarious. Some welcomed the 
releases and the return of the victims either as a manifestation of the professed ‘socialist 
humanism’ of the regime or as a belated correction of a historic wrong-doing. Others were 
antagonistic for a variety of reasons: fearful locals complained that too many murderers, 
rapists, wartime fascist collaborators and thieves had been set free;
57
 believers regarded the 
amnesties as ‘an act of God’, having nothing to do with the state; liberal intellectual strata 
saw no reason to praise the authorities for liberating innocent people; and others still used the 
periodic pardons to vent their general opposition to the existing repressive order.  
 Nevertheless, at least in the Czechoslovak case, as McDermott and Pinerová argue, fairly 
broad strata of the population adopted an intermediate position of ‘critical loyalty’ to the 
rehabilitation process (and the communist system as a whole), based largely on a shared class 
or ‘workerist’ perspective and a populist illiberalism, whereby many citizens condemned the 
premature release of middle-class ‘enemies’ and their perceived preferential access to jobs, 
accommodation, pensions and other benefits. Paradoxically, while such attitudes were 
ostensibly critical of the official amnesties and releases, they might better be interpreted as a 
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source of underlying, albeit fragile, affinity between diverse sections of society and the 
communist regime.  
 The reactions of the amnestied and rehabilitees themselves also differed widely. A typical 
mentality, no doubt partly induced by the physical and psychological exhaustion of camp life, 
appears to have been resignation, de-politicisation and withdrawal into private life. If we are 
to believe official archival sources, a minority genuinely regretted their past misdemeanours 
and wished to contribute to the ‘great socialist experiment’. Substantial numbers, however, 
continued to harbour real grievances against the system and sought ways of challenging the 
communist authorities. Across the Soviet Union, as Sheila Fitzpatrick has maintained, 
‘formers prisoners were both a serious social problem in the 1950s and 1960s and a major 
source of sedition’.58 They were rarely permitted to reintegrate into social and work life, were 
constantly harassed by the security services and quite often shunned by local people.  
 Both here and in Eastern Europe, even those readmitted to the party elite could not always 
be relied upon to remain silent in public. In his chapter on Bulgaria, Baev gives the example 
of Stefan Bogdanov, jailed after the Kostov trial in 1949, released in 1956, but again 
dismissed from state service in 1968 and later arrested and expelled from the Bulgarian party 
in 1981. In Hungary, which in the late 1940s had one of the highest numbers of terror victims 
relative to the size of its population, a politics and ‘language of grief’ (Pető) was mobilised 
by the rehabilitated communist and veteran anti-fascist campaigner Júlia Rajk, thereby 
helping to bring an end to Mátyás Rákosi’s leadership of the party in July 1956 and paving 
the way for the revolution that took place in October-November. And finally, as is well 
known, in the mid-1960s rehabilitees in Czechoslovakia played an important role in 
subverting the neo-Stalinist regime of Antonín Novotný, culminating in the Prague Spring of 
1968. More than anything else, we would argue, it is this momentous event in the history of 
East European communism – with its many ‘conspicuous  connections’ both to 1953 and 
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1956, and to 1989
59
 – that ultimately lays bare the broader significance of the inter-connected 
processes of de-Stalinisation, rehabilitation and the undermining of the legitimacy of 
communist rule in the post-Stalinist period.  
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